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Bidders in auctions must decide whether and when to incur the cost of
estimating the most they are willing to pay. This can explain why people
seem to get carried away, bidding higher than they had planned before the
auction and then ﬁnding they had paid more than the object was worth to
t h e m . E v e nw h e ns u c hb e h a v i o ri sr a t i o n a l ,e xa n t e ,i tm a yb ep e r c e i v e d
as irrational if one ignores other situations in which people revise their bid
ceilings upwards and are happy when that enables them to win the auction.
Indiana University Foundation Professor, Department of Business Economics
and Public Policy, Kelley School of Business,Indiana University, BU 456, 1309 E.
10th Street, Bloomington, Indiana, 47405-1701. Oﬃce: (812) 855-9219. Fax: 812-
855-3354. Erasmuse@indiana.edu, www.rasmusen.org. www.rasmusen.org/papers/carried-
rasmusen.pdf.
I thank Michael Baye, Rene Kirkegaard, Kerry Krutilla, Yacheng Sun, and par-
ticipants in seminars at Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business, DePaul
University, the University of Tokyo’s economics department, and the 2004 In-
ternational Industrial Organization Conference for their comments, and Harvard
Law School’s Olin Center and the University of Tokyo’s Center for International
Research on the Japanese Economy for their hospitality.1. Introduction
Do people get carried away at auctions? Certainly they do in the sense
of bidding more than they had intended when they arrived at the auction.
What must be determined is why that happens. Most simply, other people
bid more than expected, so a bidder ends up paying more than he thought he
would. But what we usually think of as getting carried away is that during
the auction a bidder raises the maximum amount he is willing to bid.
Even this often has a simple explanation: that the auction is for an
object with a common value component, so that during the auction our
bidder learns from the high bids of other people that the object is worth
more than he had thought earlier. That, too, is not what we think of as
getting carried away. Rather, we think of a private value auction– of some
good that the bidder intends to keep for personal consumption rather than
for production or resale– in which the bidder ends up bidding more than
his pre-auction estimate of the value of the object.
The standard advice to bidders is to avoid getting carried away. One
website puts it like this:
Never go beyond a predetermined limit when bidding. Base this
limit on the information you have gathered. Avoid becoming obsessed
with an item. Doing so will lead you to bid more than the property (or
merchandise) is worth. If you are bidding on a tax sale property, you
might bring a certiﬁed cheque for the maximum amount you intent
to bid. This should ensure that you do not get carried away with the
bidding process. If you are the successful bidder and the property is
sold for less than the amount on your cheque, the clerk/treasurer will
issue a refund for the diﬀerence.
Avoid catching auction fever. This happens when bidders get
carried away with the process; they will bid on anything and ev-
erything that is being auctioned and often will end up being the
owner of things they did not even want and paying far too much
for these items. The opposite of auction fever is auction paralysis.
This occurs when the bidder is paralysed with fear and thus is un-
a b l et om a k eab i d . A p p a r e n t l ys u c has t a t ei so f t e nd u et oaf e a r
of overpaying. If you don’t overcome it you will never get started.
2Often, if you fail to do your homework, you will not have the con-
ﬁdence to bid. (“Tax Sale Properties/Auction Guidelines,” (http:
//www.taxsaleproperties.com/abt 7.html)
It is quite plausible that people make such mistakes (see Malhotra &
Murnighan [2000] for a persuasive example of irrational bidding, or the survey
evidence of confusion about auction rules on page 14 of Roth & Ockenfels
[2002]), and even more plausible that in auctions, as in ordinary purchases,
p e o p l ee n du ps p e n d i n ge x t r a v a g a n t l yon current consumption to their later
regret. I wish to propose another explanation, however, for bidders who end
up paying more than their pre-auction maxima: that the bidder rationally
revises his estimate of the value of the object upwards during the course of
the auction, so at the moment of purchase he actually does value it at more
than the price he pays. The model will still be one with purely private values,
since our bidder will not be deriving any information about his own value
from the other players’ bids. The diﬀerence from the standard private-value
auction will be that it is costly for him to discover his own private value, so
he defers doing so until the middle of the auction. At that point he might
revise it upwards—“auction fever”— or he might revise it downwards— “auction
paralysis”.
The model that will be used is similar to the models of Compte & Jehiel
(2000) and Rasmusen (2003a): a bidder in a private-value ascending auction
will be uncertain about his value and will be able to pay a ﬁxed amount to
improve his information. Unlike in those models, here his information will
still be imperfect after value discovery, and we will focus on his decision to
update his bid rather than on the auction’s payoﬀs or welfare implications
under diﬀerent auction rules. Note, too, that the situation is quite unlike that
in models such as Persico (2000) and the articles cited there which examine
the incentives to gather information on the value of objects only before, not
during, an auction.
2. The Model
There are two possible buyers in an auction for an object, both risk-
3neutral and with private values which are statistically independent.
Bidder 1’s value is v1, which has three components: v1 = µ+u+².B i d d e r
1 does not know the sizes of u, ²,o rv1.H ed o e sk n o wµ, and he knows that
that u and ² are independently distributed according to symmetric densities
f(u)a n dg(²) with mean zero and supports such that Min(µ + u + ²) ≥ 0,
so that v1 ≥ 0. As a result, Bidder 1’s initial expectation of v1 equals µ.I f
he wishes, at any time he can pay c and learn the value of u immediately.
He cannot discover the other component, ²,h o w e v e r ,u n t i la f t e rt h ea u c t i o n .
Bidder 2’s value, v2,i sα with probability θ and β with probability
(1−θ), where α, θ,a n dβ are common knowledge; and θ ∈ (0,1), α ∈ (0,µ),
and β >µ . We do not need any assumption on the expected value of v2
relative to v1. Bidder 2 knows the value of v2 but not the value of v1.
The auction is open and ascending. The price starts at zero and rises
continuously until one player drops out, at which point the other player wins
the object and pays that price. A player’s bidding strategy is a choice of a
price at which to drop out (a “bid ceiling”) in an open- exit auction such
as this one. This setup avoids the technical untidiness created when the
winnning player must bid a positive increment higher than the next-highest
bid in order to win.
Discussion of the Assumptions
Our purpose is to model a situation in which a bidder is uncertain about
( a )h i sv a l u ea n d( b )w h e t h e rt h e r ee x i s t sa n yo t h e rp l a y e rw h o s ev a l u ei s
higher. The model’s focus is on his decision on whether to incur the cost of
learning more about his value.
W ea s s u m et h el o wv a l u ef o rB i d d e r2 ,α,t ob el e s st h a nµ so that if
v2 = α Bidder 1 will win the auction even if he just bids up to µ.T h ev a l u e
α is assumed to exceed µ − u so that Bidder 1’s ex post payoﬀ might be
negative if he wins at a price of α.
We assume the possible high value for Bidder 2, β, exceeds µ so that
4if v2 = β Bidder 1 will lose the auction if he just bids up to µ.N o t e t h a t
however high β may be, under our assumptions there is still some chance
that (µ + u) will be high enough that Bidder 1 will win the auction.
Ad i ﬀerent way to model this situation would be to assume general
diﬀerentiable distributions for v2 as well as for u and ². That model will
be used in Section 4. The assumption of a two-point distribution used here,
however, will allow for some interesting comparative statics, and will be
heuristically useful.
In this game it is especially important to think of the probabilities of
each of Bidder 2’s types, v2 = α and v2 = β, as being the subjective probabil-
ities of the uninformed player, which are not necessarily the true population
magnitudes. The variable θ represents the strength of Bidder 1’s belief that
Bidder 2’s value is low. Note that θ can be arbitrarily close to one and the
results of the model still hold. The model is most interesting for high values
of θ, which represent situations in which Bidder 1 is surprised to ﬁnd that
he faces tight competition from Bidder 2.
Rasmusen (2003a) also models a bidder who begins a private value auc-
tion unsure of his own value but who can pay c to acquire information. The
important diﬀerences between that model and this one are that here if the
uninformed bidder pays c then (a) he acquires the value information imme-
diately, not after a time lag, and (b) he only acquires better information
about his value, not perfect information. The absence of a time lag means
that the informed bidder has no incentive to strategically delay bidding, the
“sniping” phenomenon at the heart of my other article. The imperfection
of the information means that even if the uninformed bidder makes optimal
decisions ex ante, ex post he may regret having made them.
3. The Equilibrium
Each bidder must decide on a bid ceiling. Bidder 1 must also decide at
what bid level, if any, to pay c to discover u, after which he may wish to
revise his bid ceiling.
5The optimal bidding strategies are straightforward. A player should
choose a bid ceiling equal to the expected value of the object being auctioned.
If he bids any less, he could lose even though the winning price was less than
his expected value. If he bids any more, he could win at a price greater than
his expected value.
Thus, if Bidder 1 does not acquire any information about his value, his
best strategy is to bid up to µ, the expected value of the object to him. If
he does discover u, his optimal strategy is to bid up to (µ + u), his updated
estimate of v1. Bidder 2’s optimal strategy is to choose a bid ceiling of
v2. Note that there is no beneﬁt to Bidder 2 in changing his bid ceiling in
order to aﬀect the timing of Bidder 1’s value discovery; value discovery is
instantaneous, so timing is unimportant in this model, unlike in Rasmusen
(2003a), where value discovery cannot take place late in the auction.
Bidder 1 has three value discovery strategies that might be optimal in
equilibrium: early discovery, late discovery, and no discovery. The early
discovery strategy is to pay to discover u when the bid level reaches some
value b∗ ∈ [0,α), most simply at the start of the auction, so b∗ =0 . T h e
late discovery strategy is to pay to discover u if the bid level reaches some
level b∗ ≥ α and Bidder 2 has failed to drop out, most simply if the bidding
reaches Bidder 1’s initial bid ceiling, so b∗ = µ. The strategy of no discovery
is to refuse to pay to discover u regardless of what happens.
Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ if he chooses never to pay to discover his
value is
π1(no discovery)=θ(µ − α)+( 1− θ)(0), (1)
because with probability θ he will win the auction at a price of α and with
probability (1 − θ) he will lose the auction.
Bidder 1’s expected payoﬀ from late discovery– paying c and discover-
ing v1 if and only if Bidder 2 does not drop out at the price of α–i sm a d e
up of the expected value of winning at price α and the expected value of
6winning at price beta when µ + u>β.




β−µ[(µ + u) − β]f(u)du
i
(2)
Bidder 1’s payoﬀ from early discovery is made up of the cost c plus the
expected value of winning at price α when µ + u>α and v2 = α,p l u st h e














[(µ + u) − β]f(u)du
¸ (3)
We can now make more precise what happens in equilibrium. If c is low
enough, early discovery is best: Bidder 1 pays c at the start of the game to
avoid the negative payoﬀ from winning even at the low price of α when v1
happens to be low. For moderate levels of c,l a t ed i s c o v e r yi sb e s t :h ew a i t s
until he observes Bidder 2 bidding more than α and then to pay c to discover
his value. If c is high enough, no discovery is best; he sticks with his initial
bid ceiling and never pays c. The optimal value discovery strategies are made








[(µ + u) − β]f(u)du
(4)
Proposition 1: All three value discovery strategies can be optimal, depending
on the value of the discovery cost c:
Early discovery if c ≤ A1 − (µ − α)
Late discovery if c ∈ [A1 − (µ − α),A 2]
No discovery if c ≥ A2
(5)
7If Bidder 2’s possible high value is farther from µ than his possible low value,
then the middle range is empty and late discovery is not optimal: If β −µ>
µ − α then late discovery will not occur.
Proof: The payoﬀs in equations (3), (2), and (1) can be written as:
(a) π1(early discovery)= θ(−c + A1)+( 1− θ)(−c + A2)
(b) π1(late discovery)= θ(µ − α)+( 1− θ)(−c + A2)
(c) π1(no discovery)= θ(µ − α)
(6)
The early discovery payoﬀ in equation (6a) is greater than the late discovery
payoﬀ in equation (6b) whenever c<A 1 −(µ −α). The no discovery payoﬀ
in equation (6c) is greater than the late discovery payoﬀ in equation (6b)
whenever c>A 2.
If A1 − (µ − α) <A 2, then the middle range of c values is not empty




(µ + u − α)f(u)du − (µ − α) <
Z ∞
β−µ
(µ + u − β)f(u)du (7)
or
0 < −(µ − α)[F(∞) − F(α − µ)] −
Z β−µ
α−µ
uf(u)du +( µ − α)+( µ − β)[F(∞) − F(β − µ)]
0 < (µ − α)F(α − µ) −
Z β−µ
α−µ
uf(u)du +( µ − β)[1 − F(β − µ)].
(8)
Suppose µ−α > β −µ. Then the middle term of the right side of inequality
(8),−
R β−µ
α−µ uf(u)du, which is the expected value of u conditional on being
between µ − α and β − µ, is positive. Is the positive ﬁrst term’s magnitude
greater than the negative third term’s? Yes, for the following reason. Since
the distribution F is symmetric, if µ−α = β−µ (contrary to our assumptions)
then
(µ − α)F(α − µ)+( µ − β)[1 − F(β − µ)] (9)
8equals zero. Suppose now that we increase µ − α,s ot h a ti te x c e e d sβ − µ.
Since d/dz zF(z)=F(z)+zf(z) > 0, this increases the ﬁrst, positive,
term of expression (9) while leaving the second, negative, term unaﬀected.
Thus, expression (9), when brought into accordance with the assumption
that µ−α > β −µ, is positive, expressions (8) and (7) are positive, and the
middle range of c in Proposition 1 is not empty; otherwise, it is, and late
discovery is not optimal. ¥
Inequality (7) is true if µ−α > β−µ; that is, if the low Bidder 2 value, α,
is further from Bidder 1’s expected value, µ, than is the high Bidder 2 value,
β. If this were not true, then as the discovery cost c increased, Bidder 1 would
simply jump from early discovery to no discovery. Bidder 1 would choose no
discovery if c became too big to justify paying it to avoid overpaying α when
µ + u>α. But in that case, when the bid rose to α and Bidder 2 was still
in the auction, Bidder 1 would ﬁnd af o r t i o r ithat c w a st o ob i gt oj u s t i f y
paying it to gain the chance of winning the auction when µ + u>β.
Having established the equilibrium, we can now see how Bidder 1’s be-
havior is aﬀected by changes in parameters other than c.
Proposition 2: Bidder 1’s willingness to pay to improve his estimate of falls
with the toughness of competition but is unaﬀected by the probability of tough
competition: the level of c which makes “No Discovery” optimal is falling in
β and unchanged in θ.
Proof: Bidder 1’s willingness to pay to improve his estimate is captured by
the bounds in Proposition 1. In particular, he will follow the policy of no




[(µ + u) − β]f(u)du (10)
T h ed e r i v a t i v eo fA2 with respect to β is then
dA2
dβ




9which is negative. The derivative of A2 with respect to θ is zero.
Thus, increases in β expand the parameter range for no discovery but
increases in θ leave it unchanged. ¥
The intuition behind the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 is that as β increases
and becomes further from µ, it becomes less likely that the expected value
after discovery, (µ+u), will be greater than β and Bidder 1 will want to in-
crease his bid and win the auction. Thus, giving up becomes more attractive,
unless the cost c of discovering u is low. It is interesting to see what happens
near β = µ (though the assumptions of the model rule out β ≤ µ). For
β ≤ µ, Bidder 1 would not pay even a tiny c to discover u, because Bidder
2 would have already dropped out and it would be too late for Bidder 1 to
change his behavior. If, however, β is just slightly above µ,t h e nt h ev a l u e
of information about u is very large because with a probability of almost .5,
discovery of u will lead Bidder 1 to change his behavior.
The key to the second part of Proposition 2 is that the decision between
late and no discovery is deferred until new information arrives that renders
irrelevant θ, the probability that v2 = β. Bidder 1 need not decide about
paying c until he sees that Bidder 2’s value must be high— at which point the
ex ante probability it is high is moot.
Interpretation as Getting Carried Away
This model provides an interpretation for “getting carried away” in an
auction. Suppose we see a bidder winning an auction at a price higher than
the most he entered the auction being willing to pay, and that he later regrets
having won at that high price—what I will call an “unhappy victory.” At the
start of the auction, µ was the most Bidder 1 intended to bid. The auction
begins, and the bidding rises to µ. Now, however, he reconsiders, and raises
his bid ceiling to (µ+u). This new ceiling is greater than β,t h em o s tB i d d e r
2 will pay. Bidder 1 thus wins the auction, at price β. After the auction
is over, however, he discovers ² and ﬁnds that µ + u + ²<β.H e s a y s t o
himself: “I got carried away and bid too much. I wish I’d stuck with my
10original ceiling of µ.”
This, of course, is only one possible scenario. It is worth exploring the
conditions under which unhappy victories occur. In the story above, Bidder
1 had an unhappy victory. With equal likelihood, after the auction is over
he would have discovered ²>0, so his consumer surplus would have been
even higher than he had expected— a sort of “extra-happy victory”.
It is worth comparing the probability of unhappy victories with and
without value discovery. Even if he does not discover u and increase his bid
ceiling, Bidder 1 will still sometimes overpay. Suppose we are in the middle
range of costs, so Bidder 1 is following the policy of late discovery. If Bidder
2 ’ sv a l u et u r n so u tt ob el o w( v2 = α), Bidder 1 will win at a price of α.T h i s
is less than the expected value of v1,w h i c hi sµ, but it might be more than the
true value of v1,w h i c hi sµ +u+², giving rise to an unhappy victory. Since
u and ² have symmetric distributions, however, unhappy victories will occur
with probability less than 50%. Indeed, if α is low, unhappy victories may
be very rare. Victories without value discovery— without “getting carried
away”— will occur only if the competition from Bidder 2 is weak, so the
winning price is low and Bidder 1 will come away with a good chance of
sizeable consumer surplus.
On the other hand, if Bidder 2’s value turns out to be high (v2 = β),
Bidder 1 will pay to discover u,a n di fu is high enough he will raise his bid
ceiling high enough to win at a price of β. T h i si sl e s st h a nt h ee x p e c t e d
value of v1,w h i c hi sµ + u,b u ti tm i g h tb em o r et h a nt h et r u ev a l u eo fv1,
which is µ + u + ², giving rise to an unhappy victory.
What is the probability of this unhappy victory? For the borderline case
of µ + u = β, an unhappy victory has probability 50%. For higher values of
u, the probability of an unhappy victory falls. But victories following value
discovery— those that happen because the bidder “gets carried away”— occur
only if the competition from Bidder 2 is strong. The winning price is thus
high, and Bidder 1’s chance of coming away with positive consumer surplus
may be very little higher than his chance of coming away with negative
consumer surplus.
11Thus, situations in which Bidder 1 pays to discover his value and then
increases his bid ceiling and wins the auction are worse situations for him
than when he does not pay to discover his value but wins the auction anyway.
This is not because the strategy of late discovery is suboptimal, though— it
is not. Rather, it is because actually carrying through and discovering his
value under that strategy only occurs after bad news— the news that he is
facing tough bidding competition. The strategy of late discovery is analogous
to a person’s strategy of using chemotherapy if he is diagnosed with cancer.
Under that strategy, chemotherapy will come to be associated with pain and
death, but that does not lessen its usefulness in making the best of a bad
situation.
4. A Model with Continuous Densities
In the model above, Bidder 2 had two possible values. This brings
sharply into relief the late discovery strategy, in which Bidder 1 delays discov-
ering his value in the hope that nobody else will have a high value. Another
possible case, not more general, but equally interesting, is when Bidder 2 has
a continuous distribution for his value. We will model that in a way similar
to Rasmusen (2003a), adapted to the auction rules and instantaneous value
discovery assumed in the present paper. This will show that the phenomenon
of a bidder increasing his reservation bid in the course of an auction is robust,
and, indeed, in the continuous density model not only will value discovery
be optimal if c is not too large, but the optimality of late discovery for mod-
erate levels of c will not require any condition analogous to that stated in
Proposition 1.
As in Section 2, let there be two possible bidders, both risk-neutral, with
private values which are statistically independent.
Our assumption about Bidder 1 will remain the same. Bidder 1’s value
is v1, which has three components: v1 = µ + u + ². Bidder 1 does not know
the sizes of u, ²,o rv1.H e d o e s k n o w µ, and he knows that that u and ²
are independently distributed according to symmetric densities f(u)a n dg(²)
with mean zero and supports such that Min(µ + u + ²) ≥ 0, so that v1 ≥ 0.
12As a result, Bidder 1’s initial expectation of v1 equals µ. If he wishes, at any
time he can pay c and learn the value of u immediately. He cannot discover
the other component, ²,h o w e v e r ,u n t i la f t e rt h ea u c t i o n .
Unlike in Section 2, we will now assume that Bidder 2’s value, v2,i s
distributed according to an atomless and diﬀerentiable density h(v2)o n[ α,β],
where 0 < α <µand β >µand where h(v2) > 0 for all v2 on that interval.
Bidder 2 does not know v1, but he does know v2. All parameters are common
knowledge.
As in Section 3, Bidder 2’s optimal strategy is to choose a bid ceiling
equal to v2. Bidder 1’s optimal bid ceiling is Ev1, which will be either µ or
(µ+u), depending on whether he has learned u. Bidder 1 must also choose a
“discovery level” p– a bid level at which Bidder 1 pays c to discover u,w h e r e
possibly p<α (early discovery, because Bidder 1 will pay to discover his
value before discovering anything about v2)o rp>µ(no discovery, because
without discovery it never happens that the price rises above µ).
To analyze Bidder 1’s payoﬀ as a function of p, let us start by supposing
(contrary to the assumptions) that Bidder 1 knows v2. Suppose also that
p ≤ µ, so that there is positive probability that Bidder 1 pays c and discovers
u.
If v2 <pthen Bidder 1 wins the auction at price v2, for an expected
payoﬀ of (µ − v2).
If v2 >pthen he pays c to discover u.H el o s e st h ea u c t i o ni fµ+u<p ;
otherwise, he wins. Overall, if v2 >phis expected payoﬀ is






(µ + u − v2)f(u)du. (12)
Integrating over the possible values of v2 yields an overall expected payoﬀ















13If, on the other hand, p>µ , then Bidder 1 is following the policy of no




(µ − v2)h(v2)dv2. (14)
Proposition 3: In the model with continuous value densities, the optimal
discovery level, p∗,r i s e sw i t hc, rising strictly if p∗ ∈ (α,µ).B i d d e r1w i l l
follow a policy of early discovery (p∗ ∈ [0,α))i fc is low enough, late discovery
(p∗ ∈ [α,µ]) for higher levels of c, and no discovery (p∗ ∈ (µ,∞])i fc is
suﬃciently high.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating equation (13) with respect to p yields
dπ1









c +( µ − p) −
R ∞







u=−∞(µ − p + u)f(u)du −
R ∞











If h(p) is positive (which it is between α and µ)a n dc is small enough, then
this derivative is negative. If c is small enough, dπ1
dp < 0f o rp ∈ [α,µ], and
proﬁtr i s e si fp is reduced to below α — that is, to early discovery. If p<α,
then h(p) = 0, so further reductions are unimportant— early discovery can
take the form of any p in the interval [0,α).
If c is greater, then
dπ1
dp > 0a tp = α,a n dt h eo p t i m a lp exceeds α.



















h(p)+( 0 ) h0(p),
< 0,
(16)
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a tdπ1
dp = 0 at the optimum to obtain the term
(0)h0(p) .S i n c ei ti sa l s ot r u et h a t
d2π1
dpdc =( 1 ) h(p)
> 0,
(17)
the implicit function theorem tells us that
dp
dc > 0w h e nh(p) > 0, i.e., the
optimal discovery level rises continuously with the cost of discovery. This
m e a n st h a tt h e r ee x i s tl e v e l so fc such that the optimal discovery level lies
within the interval (α,µ), so late discovery is optimal. It also means that
as c increases, eventually the optimal discovery level exceeds µ,s ot h a tn o
discovery becomes optimal. ¥
If the discovery cost is low enough, early discovery is best, because
the bidder averts the possibility that he might pay more than his value by
winning even at the other bidder’s lowest possible value. If the discovery cost
is somewhat higher, it is not worth payingi tt oa v o i dt h a tr i s k ,a n dt h eb i d d e r
will choose late discovery. How late depends on the size of the discovery cost,
and the optimal discovery level rises smoothly with the discovery cost, and
if the discovery cost is too high, then no discovery becomes optimal.
Thus, we see that Section 3’s conclusion that a bidder may decide to
increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction is robust to allowing ri-
val values to take more than two possible levels. The comparative statics of
Proposition 2 (on what happens when the probability θ of a low v2 change)
15are not easily adapted to the continuous model, but a new kind of compar-
ative statics result possible only in the continuous model is be derived in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: As the degree of uncertainty over his private value increases,
Bidder 1 becomes more willing to pay to discover his value: if p∗ <µ , then
p∗ falls if we spread density f(u) using a strict decrease in f on any interval
[r,s] and a strictly increase everywhere else, while leaving the mean of u
unchanged at zero.
Proof. Let us deﬁne X as a component of equation (15) (rearranged here
slightly):
dπ1





(u − [µ − p])f(u)du
¶
h(p)






where x ≡ u − [µ − p].
Changing f aﬀects only the third term, which is always positive because
it includes only values of u such that (u − [µ − p]) ≥ 0. Making f riskier
using the conventional deﬁnition of risk from Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970)
might leave X unchanged (as in Figure 1a, where the density changes in four
regions, all to the right of p−µ), or might increase it (as in Figure 1b, where
the density falls between r and s but increases everywhere else).
Suppose, however, we spread out f using a strict decrease in f on any
interval [r,s] and a strictly increase everywhere else, while leaving the mean
of u unchanged at zero. This is the continuous-distribution analog of the
concept of “pointwise riskiness” that I explore at greater length in Rasmusen
(2004). This ﬂattens f because while the mean stays the same, the density
strictly declines on the middle interval and strictly increases on each side of
it. This forces an increase in f everywhere to the right of s.S i n c et h es p r e a d
leaves the unconditional mean of v2 unchanged, it must increase the mean
of v2 conditional upon v2 being above any speciﬁc value— and in particular,
above p−µ,s o
R ∞
u=p−µ Xf(u)du must increase. If
R ∞
u=p−µ Xf(u)du increases,
16then p must fall if we are at an interior solution and the derivative is to stay
equal to zero. ¥
Figure 1: Two Kinds of Increase in Risk
Proposition 4 is true because value discovery has option value, and op-
tion value increases with the amount of uncertainty. When the uncertainty
is larger, there is a greater probability that value discovery will disclose that
µ + u>b e t a , even though the expected value of u is zero. Thus, even a
risk-neutral Bidder 1 likes having more uncertainty.
Note that ², the size of the remaining uncertainty over v1, is irrelevant to
Bidder 1’s decision. It could be that this uncertainty is far larger than that
from u,b u tt h i sm a k e sn od i ﬀerence to the value to Bidder 1 of information
about u.I t w o u l d m a k e a d i ﬀerence if Bidder 1 were risk averse, but we
have assumed he is risk neutral, and a risk-neutral player only cares about
variance to the extent that it aﬀects option value. The variable ² will enter
our analysis in the next subsection.
175. Concluding Remarks
I have suggested an explanation for the phenomenon of bidders getting
carried away in auctions. The man on the street would say that when a
bidder has increased his bid ceiling from what he had decided before the
auction, he has been overcome by emotion. He might also say that the
bidder bid so high simply because he wanted to win, rather than because
he wanted to own the object, but this variant too must rely on economic
irrationality, since a rational bidder would factor his utility from winning
into his original bid ceiling. I do not deny that there may be an emotional
explanation; in fact, formalizing and testing such an explanation would be
w o r t h w h i l e .H e r e ,h o w e v e r ,Ih a v ep r o p o s e da na l t e r n a t i v e :i nt h ec o u r s eo f
the bidding, the bidder rethinks his private value, and with some probability
his rethinking results in an upwards revision of the amount he is willing to
pay. This revision is rational, and, indeed, it would be irrational for the
bidder to incur too much cost in determining the maximum he is willing to
pay before he knows whether that maximum will be a binding constraint.
Our paradigmatic example for the private-value auction is the open- cry
ascending antique auction, but the idea of value discovery applies to any
auction, and, indeed, the present model applies best when time pressure
exists but is not so intense, so that a bidder does have a chance to reﬂect
on his willingness to pay. One applicati o nw i t hw h i c hm a n yr e a d e r so ft h i s
article may have experience is in house purchases. In buying a house, a
person’s ﬁrst aim is to ﬁnd a house for which his private value exceed the
likely price. Once he has found such a house, however, he may well ﬁnd
that other buyers also are interesting in it, in which case an auction, usually
informal but sometimes formal, begins. At that point, the buyer will think
h a r d e ra b o u th i sp r i v a t ev a l u e ,a n dm a yr e v i s ei te i t h e ru po rd o w n ,b u tt h e
buyer would have been foolish to undergo the emotional strain of such ﬁne
valuation if not forced to by tight competition.
The value discovery explanation for bid updates has three empirical
implications that could help to test it. First, in the value discovery model
the carried-away winner would regret having won less than half of the time–
18less than half, because even though his revised value is still an overestimate,
he usually will not have to pay the entire amount to win the auction. Second,
as h o r t“ c o o l i n go ﬀ period” would presumably aﬀect an emotional winner
more than a value-discovering winner, although even in the value discovery
model, the winner would, after thinking more, wish to return the object a
signiﬁcant fraction of the time.1 Third, the value discovery model implies
that if the value is more uncertain, the bidder will be more likely to increase
his bid ceiling in the course of the auction, because the option value of value
discovery is higher. An emotional explanation might or might not have this
implication.
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